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ABSTRACT
Distributed Ledger Technologies have promising applications in
the Internet of Things. However, scalability and support for mi-
cropayments remain problems for blockchain-based applications,
therefore other alternatives such as IOTA should be considered.
This work reports on an experimental evaluation of IOTA on several
different IoT platforms. We show that even though the communica-
tion overhead to join the IOTA network can be significantly reduced
by adapting a proxy-based architecture, the computational over-
head remains high. We conclude that IOTA is not currently suitable
for battery-powered IoT devices.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) provide a completely novel
way for transfer value between parties that do not trust each another.
Many Internet of Things (IoT) systems would immensely benefit
from having such a way of transferring value in a peer-to-peer,
opportunistic fashion. As a result, these is a real need to integrate
DLT in the IoT. IOTA [11] is one of cryptocurrencies that aims
to be suitable for micropayments and machine-to-machine (M2M)
economy in particular.
One of the core claims of IOTA is that the due to their sheer
number, a network of IoT devices can “outcompute” a network of
traditional high-performance machines, even though the latter in-
dividually are much more powerful. Since there already are billions
of IoT devices today, and their numbers are expected to increase
sharply in the coming years, this is a strikingly interesting claim.
However, there is a number of complications. First, the term “IoT
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device” refers to a vast variety of different devices that are spanning
a wide range of computational capabilities [2]. The less powerful
IoT devices may not have a sufficient amount of RAM and program
memory to run the Proof-of-Work (PoW) and other algorithms re-
quired to participate in the IOTA network. Second, the majority
of IoT devices are also characterized by the need to save energy.
Due to this reason, their available computational power may be
much smaller than their nominal power. More analysis is required
to understand the current scope of applicability of IOTA to IoT.
To this end, this work makes the following contributions:
• It outlines and compares a number of different network ar-
chitectures for bridging IoT devices with the IOTA network.
• It quantifies the time and energy consumption for commu-
nication with the IOTA network depending on the network
architecture.
• It quantifies the time and energy consumption for IOTA
operations on a number of hardware platforms.
2 BACKGROUND
In many IoT applications, there is a need to transfer value between
the IoT devices and other parties. The value can be either in form
of valuable, authenticated sensor data, services, or micropayments.
At the moment, such transfers are implemented through billing
arrangements. However, setting up and maintaining such arrange-
ments is cumbersome and not always feasible. For a few examples,
consider cars and road-side units interacting in an intelligent trans-
portation system. Two cars meeting on the road may want to buy
data from each another: for instance, data about the road condi-
tions ahead. A car may similarly want to buy data from a road-side
unit that is equipped with sensors and has communication links
with other nearby units. Finally, an overtaking maneuver between
autonomous cars may be facilitated through a small payment with
the aim to incentivise moving aside and letting pass by.
In general, blockchains can be used for these payments. How-
ever, permission-less, Proof-of-Work based blockchains [10] re-
quire transaction fees, therefore are not directly suitable for micro-
payments. Private, permission-based blockchains are much more
lightweight [3]; however, they necessarily remove other important
properties for Proof-of-Work based blockchains, such as censor-
ship resistance. Unlike blockchains, other DLT technologies such
as IOTA aims to make the IoT devices first-class actors in the net-
work. IOTA is a cryptocurrency based on the Tangle [11], a novel
distributed consensus mechanism that is used DAG. It is developed
by the IOTA Foundation, a non-profit organization registered in
Germany.
The IOTA network and the Tangle are maintained by IOTA full
nodes. These full nodes are required to have high computational
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Figure 1: Different network architectures for bridging IoT devices with the IOTA network.
capacity and high-speed internet access. A much larger number of
light nodes also participate in the network. Unlike the full nodes,
they do not keep a copy of the Tangle in their memory. Nevertheless,
these light nodes have a very important role to play. According to
the IOTA design vision, that the light nodes are going to perform
the bulk of the Proof-of-Work computations required to secure
the IOTA network. In this way, the more nodes participate in the
network, the more secure it becomes. In theory, many IoT devices
are computationally capable of fulfilling the role of the light node.
The IOTA security model relies on the assumption that due to
their sheer number, the computationally less powerful IoT devices
are capable of out-computing dedicated high-power machines that
any attackers might have. At the core, both PoW and transaction
signing in IOTA consists of computing the Keccak hash function [1]
many times over. This function is currently not widely hardware-
accelerated, however, it may become such in the future, since Keccak
has been adapted as the SHA-3 standard [4].
The Tangle [11] is a directed acyclic graph; the nodes in this
graph are IOTA transactions [7]. Each transaction must include the
PoW validating two other transactions; this validation corresponds
to edges in the Tangle. An IOTA bundle is simply an atomic collec-
tion of transactions. For example, a value transfer from one IOTA
wallet to another typically is implemented as a bundle with at least
three transactions: one transaction to empty the source address,
Table 1: Estimated payload sizes for each of the architec-
tures.
Payload type Architecture #1 Architecture #2 Architecture #3
Data only 2186 trytes – –
nu = 1 – 135 trytes 2673 trytes
ns = 1 – 2322 trytes 2673 trytes
nu = 1, ns = 1 – 2457 trytes 5346 trytes
nu = 2, ns = 2 – 4914 trytes 10692 trytes
one to put the value in the destination address, and one to put the
remainder in a new local address.
IOTA for IoT has been analyzed in previous research [6, 12],
however, these papers do not consider highly-constrained devices.
3 NETWORK ARCHITECTURES
We consider IoT devices that either want to store their data in the
Tangle, or want to perform micropayments. The network infras-
tructure has to support these operations. One way how to do that is
to use a dedicated IoT proxy node: a computationally more powerful
and energy less restricted node that does some of the operations
on behalf of the IoT devices, and consequently relieves their com-
putational load. However, with the proxy approach, the IoT devices
continue to rely on the classical client-server model; consequently,
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Table 2: Estimated over-the-air transmission energy require-
ments for each of the architectures.
Payload type Architecture #1 Architecture #2 Architecture #3 Savings
due to A#2
Data only 4.5mJ – – –
nu = 1 – 0.28mJ 5.5mJ 95 %
ns = 1 – 4.8mJ 5.5mJ 13 %
nu = 1, ns = 1 – 5.1mJ 11.0mJ 54 %
nu = 2, ns = 2 – 10.1mJ 22.0mJ 54 %
they do not fully benefit from the key properties of decentralized
cryptocurrencies. For example, some level of trust in the proxy
is required. Therefore this approach may not be feasible in case
of mobile IoT nodes that want to interact with the IOTA network
outside of their “home environments”.
We consider several different architectures:
(1) Architecture #1: Using a proxy for all IOTA operations.
This (Fig. 1a) is the baseline architecture; here, the IoT devices
do not perform any IOTA operations. Instead, they fully rely
on the IoT proxy.
• Benefits. The least computational load; no additional soft-
ware required on the IoT device if data-only transfer is
sufficient; no need to store potentially valuable IOTA seeds
on the IoT devices.
• Drawbacks. An available IoT proxy device is required to
conduct all IOTA operations. High level of the trust in the
IoT proxy needed, since the proxy is storing IOTA seeds
on behalf of the devices.
• Payload transmitted by IoT. Sensor data: same as with-
out IOTA. If value transfer is desired, a custom command
protocol may be used to instruct the proxy to transmit
this on behalf of the IoT devices.
• Payload received by IoT. None.
(2) Architecture #2: Using a proxy for the Proof-of-Work.
Here (Fig. 1b), the IoT proxy is still present, and the IoT
devices rely on it for the PoW. However, the seed is stored on
the IoT device, and the proxy does not need to be as highly
trusted as in Architecture #1.
• Benefits. The communication load can be made relatively
lightweight: instead of transmitting the full IOTA bundle,
the IoT devices may transmit just the critical parts, for
example, the amount, the source and target addresses, and
the signature(s). PoW computation is not required.
• Drawbacks. Need to deploy valuable IOTA seeds and
update software on the IoT devices. Signing transactions
is sill a relatively computationally expensive.
• Payload transmitted by IoT. Signed sensor data and
signed value transactions (or parts of them, if optimiza-
tions are used).
• Payload received by IoT. None.
(3) Architecture #3: Direct communicationwithout a proxy.
Here (Fig. 1c), the IoT devices directly communicate with a
full node.
• Benefits. The simplest architecture: no additional ele-
ments required. Fully realizes the trustlessness and censor-
ship-resistance of decentralized cryptocurrencies.
• Drawbacks. Unless the full node offers to do PoW on
behalf of others, the PoW has to be done on the IoT de-
vice, which may be too computationally expensive for the
majority of them.
• Payload transmitted by IoT. The full IOTA bundle.
• Payload received by IoT. IOTA tips: i.e., hashes of two
other transactions, by the IOTA protocol required to be
validated to submit a new transaction.
For convenience, let us assume that the IoT device produces data
in batches of 2187 trytes. This is the maximal number of bytes that
can fit in the IOTA transaction’s field signatureMessageFragment,
which is meant to be reused for data storage if the signature is not
present.
With Architecture #1, the IoT device needs to transit only the data
(2187 trytes). With Architecture #3, the IoT device needs to transmit
the whole IOTA bundle, which is 2673 trytes times the number of
transactions in the bundle, as well as receives 81 × 2 trytes: the tips
from the Tangle.
With Architecture #2 the IoT device wants to transmit authen-
ticated data or a value. In the first case, the data can be put in the
signatureMessageFragment of the output transaction. Since the
output transaction does not have the space for the signature be-
cause of the data storage, a new empty output transaction can be
created. Depending on the IOTA security level, more than one in-
put transaction is needed to store the signature (the recommended
value of this parameter 2, which leads to two input transactions. If
just a small amount of data needs to be transmitted (up to 27 trytes),
that can be put on the tag field of the output transaction; or, since
the output transaction does not transfer a value, the address field
of the recipient can be reused to store the data.
The hash of an IOTA bundle is calculated based only on the
following fields: transaction addresses, tags, indexes, and a times-
tamp. This makes it possible to sign partially constructed bundles.
However, the bundle hash and therefore the signature does not di-
rectly cover the signatureMessageFragment of other transactions
in the bundle. If the IoT device does not trust the IoT proxy to fill
the output transaction with data, it can circumvent this limitation
by putting the hash of the data in the tag or address field of the
transaction, so that the hash of the bundle also covers the data,
albeit indirectly.
In case the IoT node wants to transfer a value, the structure
of the bundle is similar. IOTA does not allow the source address
to be reused; therefore, more than one output transaction may be
required in order to store the remainder of the value, as the value
transferred may be less than the total value stored in the source
address.
There is no need to transmit the whole IOTA bundle between
the IoT device and the IoT proxy. We propose that the IoT device
reduces its communication load following this algorithm:
(1) The IoT device partially constructs the bundle, filling only
the address, transaction index, tag and timestamp values.
(2) The IoT device calculates the bundle hash.
(3) The IoT device signs each transaction needing a signature.
BlockSys 2018, Nov. 2018, Shenzhen, China A. Elsts et al.
0.1 1.0 10.0
Time, sec
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
(a) Transaction signing
1 10 100 1000
Time, sec
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
(b) Proof-of-Work computation
Figure 2: Distribution of the time (a) to generate a signature
for a transaction (S = 2) and (b) to compute the Proof-or-
Work (MWM = 14). Experimental results on Raspberry Pi
3.
(4) The IoT device transmits the data, the destination addresses
& IOTA amount for each of them, and the signatures to the
IoT proxy.
(5) IoT proxy gets the tips to verify, fully constructs the bundle,
performs the PoW for each of the transactions in the bundle,
and attaches the bundle to the Tangle.
The size of IOTA address is 81 trytes, tag: 27 trytes, the amount field:
27 trytes. Overall, the amount of trytes T that need that need to be
transferred in case of a bundle with nu unsigned transactions and
ns transactions where the signatureMessageFragment is filled, is:
T = nu ×(81+27+27)+ns ×(2187+81+27+27) = 135nu +2322ns
(1)
Some examples of payload sizes are given in Table 1. Let us
now assume that the IoT device uses the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol
to transmit the data over the air. Results from research literature
report that this protocol allows to transmit up to 300 bytes per single
millijoule of energy [14], namely, use 3.3 µJ per byte or 2.06 µJ per
tryte. Using this estimate, we can calculate how much data needs to
be transmitted with each method, then convert this value to trytes,
and then estimate how much energy that would require (Table 2).
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Figure 3: Time to sign a transaction. Experimental results on
the different hardware platforms.
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4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 Hardware Platforms. For the comparison, we select two IoT
platforms and two desktop server platforms. One of them is a Class-
1 constrained IoT device [2]: the Texas Instruments (TI) Launchpad
with a CC2650 System-on-Chip. It is a development board for rapid
prototyping of energy-efficient applications, intended to be used
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Table 3: Comparison of the hardware platforms.
Platform name CPU CPU core CPU fre-
quency
RAM size Power consumption Number of
cores
TI Launchpad CC2650 Cortex-M3 48MHz 20 kB 9.6 mW [9] 1 core
Raspberry Pi 3B [13] BCM2837 Cortex-A53 1200MHz 1GB 221.0 mW per core 4 cores
Dell Optiplex Intel Core i7-6700 – 3400MHz 16GB 65 000mW TDP 8 cores
Dell Precision 7910 Intel Xeon E5-2623 – 3000MHz 32GB 105 000mW TDP 16 cores
Dell Precision 7910 Nvidia Quadro K620 – 1370MHz 2GB 41 000mW max 384 cores
Table 4: Average time measured and energy consumption estimated for the IOTA operations.
Platform name Time to sign
(S = 2)
CPU energy
to sign
Time for PoW CPU energy
for PoW
TI Launchpad 7716ms 74mJ – –
Raspberry Pi 3B 372ms 82mJ 82.9 sec 54.9 J
Intel Core i7-6700 3.5ms 28mJ 4.1 sec 233.2 J
Intel Xeon E5-2623 4.8ms 31mJ – –
Nvidia Quadro K620 – – 8.5 sec 93.5 J
with low-power network stacks such Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
and IEEE 802.15.4. Its System-on-Chip is build on the ARM Cortex-
M3 core. The second is Raspberry Pi Model 3B: a very well known
and more powerful IoT device. For networking, the Pi has a built in
WiFi and BLE module. Its CPU is built on another ARM core: the
Cortex-A53 “application processor” core. The other two desktop
servers are manufactured by Dell and have Intel processors. One of
them is also equipped with a Nvidia Quadro GPU. The summary of
the platforms is given in Table 3 (including a separate entry about
the GPU).
4.1.2 Software. In order to evaluate IOTA operations, we use soft-
ware written in C and compile it for the different target platforms.
All of the target platforms are running the Linux operating sys-
tem, with the exception of CC2650 Launchpad, which is running
Contiki-NG1: a light-weight operating system for the Internet of
Things.
Proof ofWork. To test the performance of PoW, we use CCurl2,
the C port of the Curl library. This port is developed and main-
tained by the IOTA Foundation. CCurl makes use of multiple core,
by default launching N − 1 threads on a N core machine. It also in-
corporates OpenCL support, which allows it to use the GPU instead
of the CPU for computation, if the system has a GPU.
In our experiments, the CCurl code is compiled with the GCC C
compiler, with optimization flag -O3 enabled. We also find that in
order to successfully run this code onARMarchitectures, -fsigned-
char compiler option must be enabled, since the char type is un-
signed by default on the ARM version of GCC, in contrast to signed
defaults on x86 GCC.
The CCurl is not evaluated on the CC2650 Launchpad due to its
memory limitations (the CC2650 only has 20 kB RAM). As it stands,
the CCurl implementation requires a platform with at least 64 kB
or RAM: for example, the find_nonce() function alone uses more
than 32 kB of stack memory.
1https://github.com/contiki-ng
2https://github.com/iotaledger/ccurl
We evaluate the software with the Minimum Weight Magnitude
(MWM) parameter set to 14, which is the PoW complexity currently
used in the IOTA mainnnet.
Transaction preparation and signing. We use the code of
IOTA wallet application for Ledger Blue and Nano S hardware
wallets3. We port this code to the Contiki-NG operating system,
making some minor changes in the process: for example, all calls to
file system functions and dynamic memory allocation are removed.
We compile the code with the -O2 optimization level. On CC2650
Launchpad, the Contiki-NG takes full control of the hardware ini-
tialization and control. On the server platforms and Raspberry
Pi, the “native” architecture of the Contiki-NG OS is used. When
compiled for this architecture, the Contiki-NG is run as a single
user-space process on top the host operating system (Linux).
We evaluate the software for security levels 1 and 2 (S = 1, S = 2).
The software utilizes only a single thread and does not support
computation on the GPU.
4.2 Results
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the time required to sign a trans-
action (evaluated 1000 times for each security level) and to compute
the PoW (evaluated 100 times). Both the PoW and the computation
of the signature are highly nondeterministic: surprisingly, the time
to sign can vary up to 10-fold (Fig. 2a) depending on the input.
Figure 3 compares the average time to sign a transaction on the
different hardware platforms (note: the bars here and further show
the standard deviation). It takes multiple seconds to perform this
operation on the CC2650 Launchpad, and there is also a two-orders
of magnitude difference between the Pi and the server platforms.
The time to compute the Proof-of-Work for a single transaction
is given in Fig. 4. Surprisingly, the Pi is relatively more efficient
for this operation, while the GPU significantly underperforms its
expectations: doing the PoW on a multi-core server is faster than
doing it on the GPU in our experiment.
3https://github.com/IOTA-Ledger/blue-app-iota
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Table 4 shows the time and energy consumption comparison on
the different platforms. For the server platforms and the signing
operation, we report the total energy divided by N , where N is the
total number of cores. Since the signing operation only utilizes a
single core, the maximum system load would be achieved when
N signing operations would be run in parallel. This correction is
applied because for these platforms, Table 3 lists the total power of
the CPU, rather than the consumption per core as for the Raspberry
Pi CPU. In contrast, the PoW algorithm already makes use multiple
cores (N − 1 in a system with N cores), so this correction is not
needed. Finally, for the Nvidia GPU, we report the actual energy
consumption shown by the nvidia-smi command during the test.
4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 Energy usage. 4
For the PoW, the energy consumption is between 55 and 233 J on
the average (Table 4), but can frequently take 10 or more times of
that due to the nondeterministic nature of the PoW operation. To
put these numbers in perspective, the total capacity of typical IoT
batteries ranges from 100mAh @3.3V (≈1200 J) [8] to 2700mAh
@3.6V (≈35000 J) [5]. Clearly, this operation is not suitable for
any battery-powered IoT devices. With a nontrivial probability, the
1200 J battery will run out of power before the device completes
the first PoW operation. The situation could change in the future if
hardware implementations of SHA-3 are widely deployed on IoT
devices and the rest of the factors (such as the MWM parameter)
remain the same.
Even the signing operation is surprisingly complex. The con-
ventional wisdom is that in embedded systems, communication
requires more energy than computation. However, in this case the
balance tips towards computation (compare Table 2 with Table 4):
a device requires on the order of 10 times more energy to sign a
transaction than to transmit the transaction. As a result, the number
of transactions to sign is the limiting factor for its battery lifetime.
Assuming that the device creates a two-transaction bundle every
minute, it consumes 2 × 74 = 148mJ for signing per minute (213 J
per day). With this workload, the 1200 J battery is going to last less
than 6 days even discounting the energy needed for transmissions
and for other operations.
Given the energy usage results, it is clear that on battery-powered
devices, both PoW and transaction signing are not practical without
hardware-accelerated cryptography. More powerful devices such
as Raspberry Pi are capable of doing both operations, but instanta-
neous transactions are beyond their resources: for instance, a single
Raspberry Pi Model 3B can only do the PoW for up to approximately
1000 transactions per day (Table 4).
4.3.2 Safety in numbers? Surprisingly, the Raspberry Pi computes
the PoW in just 20 times more time than the Intel Core-i7 server.
This means that a network of 20 Pis can successfully compete with
a single server (if we restrict the discussion exclusively to majority-
of-PoW type of attacks). Given the proliferation of IoT devices, it
is not unthinkable that the total available computational power of
Pi-class devices could indeed already be greater than the available
power of server-side devices, or become greater soon.
4The original submitted version had an error in this subsection; it has been fixed and
the text updated.
Clearly, the IOTAoperations can be greatly sped up by a hardware-
accelerated implementation. However, this argument equally ap-
plies both the server-side and IoT-side platforms, therefore is not
clear that adding hardware acceleration would tip the balance in the
computational power away from IoT. If IOTA-like cryptocurrencies
become more widely used in the future, the manufacturers of IoT
devices will have a strong incentive to put hardware accelerators on
their devices, which in turn would help to secure it against attackers
using dedicated, centralized hardware.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper presents a feasibility evaluation of IOTA on IoT devices.
The results show that even though communication overhead of
bridging the IOTA network with IoT can be significantly reduced
by using a gateway architecture with an IoT proxy server, the com-
putational requirements remain high. In particular, the current
battery-powered IoT devices are not suitable for IOTA operations.
In contrast, the more powerful Raspberry-Pi class IoT devices are
capable of joining the IOTA network as light nodes, and, in theory,
it not infeasible that a network of such devices could one day pro-
vide sufficient Proof-of-Work capacity to secure the IOTA network,
assuming all else remains equal.
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